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First Amendment, Second Fiddle?                                       
Free Speech in New Hampshire‘s Constitution 
ADAM RICK* 
When State constitutional issues have been raised, this court has a 
responsibility to make an independent determination of the 
protections afforded under the New Hampshire Constitution.  If we 
ignore this duty, we fail to live up to our oath to defend our 
constitution and we help to destroy the federalism that must be so 
carefully safeguarded by our people.
1
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 1. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (1983). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A car dealer in Concord, New Hampshire recently challenged the city 
zoning board‘s denial of its application to replace its existing readerboard 
(with manually changeable letters) with an electronic sign.
2
  The dealer 
argued that the city‘s zoning ordinance, prohibiting ―[s]igns which move or 
create an illusion of movement except those parts which solely indicate 
date, time, or temperature,‖ constituted an unconstitutional restriction on 
free speech under the First Amendment.
3
  The trial court agreed, but the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, applying the Central Hudson 
test
4
 and finding that the ordinance reached no ―broader than necessary to 
meet and advance [the city‘s] substantial interests of traffic safety and aes-
thetics.‖5  Conspicuously absent from the dealer‘s argument, and thus from 
the state supreme court‘s opinion,6 was any reference to Part I, Article 22 
of the New Hampshire Constitution: ―Free speech and liberty of the press 
are essential to the security of freedom in a state: They ought, therefore, to 
be inviolably preserved.‖ 
Carlson‘s Chrysler could have argued its case under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the New Hampshire Constitution, or both.
7 
 By choosing to assert only 
federal constitutional rights, however, it passed up two advantages.  First, 
free speech rights may be greater under Article 22 than the First Amend-
ment.  Second, had Carlson‘s Chrysler prevailed in the state supreme court 
based on Article 22, the city would have been unable to appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
8
  Moreover, had Carlson‘s Chrysler asserted its free 
  
 2. See Carlson‘s Chrysler v. City of Concord, 156 N.H. 399, 938 A.2d 69 (2007). 
 3. Id. at 400–01, 938 A.2d at 70–71.  The electronic sign standing outside the Carlson‘s Chrysler 
dealership today displays only the time and temperature. 
 4. The U.S. Supreme Court established a four-factor test for evaluating the constitutionality of 
commercial speech regulations in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980).  Carlson‘s Chrysler failed to challenge the zoning ordinance‘s effects on noncommer-
cial speech, which might have called for a different test of constitutionality.  Carlson’s Chrysler, 156 
N.H. at 406, 938 A.2d at 75 (Duggan, J., concurring). 
 5. Carlson’s Chrysler, 156 N.H. at 405, 938 A.2d at 74. 
 6. Cf. Appeal of Sutfin, 141 N.H. 732, 734, 693 A.2d 73, 74 (1997) (―The respondent does not 
argue that the board‘s decision violated his commercial speech rights under the State Constitution; 
consequently, we confine our analysis to the first amendment to the Federal Constitution as applied to 
the States through the fourteenth amendment.‖ (quotation omitted)). 
 7. ―A lawyer today representing someone who claims some constitutional protection and who does 
not argue that the state constitution provides that protection is skating on the edge of malpractice.‖  
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985) (quoting Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, in 
Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 14 THE CENTER MAG. 6, 12 (Sept./Oct. 1981)). 
 8. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (―[W]here the judgment of a state court rests upon 
two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the 
non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.‖  (quot-
ing Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935))). 
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speech rights under both constitutional provisions and lost, it still would 
have been entitled to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
9
 
This note explores the meaning of the free speech provision in Article 
22 of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights,
10
 added in 1968—specifically, 
whether it should be interpreted to afford greater protection than the First 
Amendment.  Part I briefly discusses the relationship between Article 22 
and the First Amendment in light of Michigan v. Long
11
 (defining the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s approach to state supreme court judgments) and State v. 
Ball
12
 (the New Hampshire Supreme Court‘s response to Long).  Part II 
traces the origin of Article 22 as originally adopted as well as its modern 
free speech provision, and offers an overview of the existing body of rele-
vant case law.  Part III explores the meaning of free speech in Article 22 
based on the text and history of the original article and the 1968 amend-
ment, analogy to the liberty of the press and other constitutional rights, and 
relevant interpretations by other state courts.  In Part IV, I conclude that 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court‘s commitment to the primacy of state 
constitutional protections, together with the strong language of the provi-
sion and persuasive authority from both the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court and other state courts, supports a robust independent jurisprudence 
for free speech under Article 22. 
II.  STATE VS. FEDERAL FREE SPEECH PROTECTION 
Renewed vigor in state constitutional law is commonly traced to 1972, 
when the California Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitu-
tional based on its state constitution‘s prohibition of cruel or unusual pu-
nishment.
13
  In a 1975 dissent,
14
 and in an article published in 1977, U.S. 
  
 9. The U.S. Supreme Court, of course, would have jurisdiction only over the interpretation of the 
First Amendment, and not Article 22.  See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 136 (2000) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (cataloguing the Supreme Court‘s deference to state court interpretations).  But since the 
First Amendment as incorporated to the states imposes a minimum standard (or ―floor‖) of constitu-
tional protection, the Supreme Court‘s review could yield the desired relief. 
 10. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 22.  Following John Adams‘s design of the Massachusetts Constitution, 
the New Hampshire Constitution begins with its Bill of Rights.  See generally State v. Tapply, 124 
N.H. 318, 324, 470 A.2d 900, 904–05 (1983); Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, 195–201 (1882) 
(discussing at length the function of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights). 
 11. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 12. 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983). 
 13. Robert F. Williams, The Third Stage of New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
211, 213 (2003) (describing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), as ―probably the most 
important early case‖ in the rise of New Judicial Federalism).  But see Randall T. Shepard, The Renais-
sance in State Constitutional Law: There Are a Few Dangers, but What’s the Alternative?, 61 ALB. L. 
REV. 1529, 1530 n.6 (1998) (suggesting that state constitutional jurisprudence arose directly from 
―multiple state supreme courts who continued to engage in state constitutional adjudication in spite of 
the nearly overpowering judicial activism of the Warren Court.‖). 
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Supreme Court Justice Brennan advocated that state courts take similar 
steps to protect individual rights through expansive readings of state con-
stitutional provisions.
15
  In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a land-
mark decision defining when it will and will not review state constitutional 
judgments.
16
  It had long been established that state high court judgments 
supported by independent state grounds are not reviewable by the U.S. 
Supreme Court,
17
 regardless of analysis under federal precedent, but Mich-
igan v. Long put the burden on state courts to ―make clear by a plain state-
ment in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only 
for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that 
the court has reached.‖18  At the time, Long was criticized as a federal en-
croachment into state authority (most forcefully by Justice Stevens, in his 
dissent), but by clarifying the way for state supreme courts to make unre-
viewable judgments based on their own state constitutions, it may have 
actually spurred development of independent state constitutional law. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court quickly heeded the U.S. Supreme 
Court‘s guidance, releasing an opinion with a ―plain statement‖ only 
months later, in State v. Ball.
19
  Ball also marked the state high court‘s 
adoption of the ―primacy‖ approach, which entails analyzing state constitu-
tional provisions before their federal counterparts, in order to give them 
their due consideration, but also to preclude federal review where possi-
  
 14. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 15. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489 (1977); see also Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 16. In Long, the Supreme Court emphasized its duty to avoid issuing advisory opinions, which 
would exist where the Court reverses a state supreme court‘s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, 
only to have the same result reached under the state constitution on remand.  463 U.S. at 1040–42; 
Charles G. Douglas, Jr., State Judicial Activism—The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 1123, 1142 (1978) (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125–26 (1945)). 
 17. That state courts‘ interpretations of their own constitutions are generally immune from review 
by the U.S. Supreme Court has long been established, despite the Supreme Court‘s general power to 
take appeals from state supreme courts.  See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (―Neither 
this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute 
different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State.‖); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 
U.S. 590, 626 (1874).  The U.S. Supreme Court‘s respect for state constitutional determinations com-
plements its prudential standing rules and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.  See Ashwander v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring): 
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by 
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed 
of. This rule has found most varied application. . . .  Appeals from the highest court of a 
state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently 
dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground. 
 18. 463 U.S. at 1041.  The Court added, ―If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly 
that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, 
will not undertake to review the decision.‖  Id. 
 19. Justice Douglas of the New Hampshire Supreme Court was already an advocate and scholar of 
independent state constitutional jurisprudence and the primacy approach several years before Ball.  See 
Douglas, supra note 16, at 1142, 1146. 
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ble.
20
  By 1986, New Hampshire had already invoked Ball‘s plain state-
ment in over a dozen cases,
21
 and at least three other states had followed 
the same course of analyzing state constitutional claims first.
22
 
Practitioners raising constitutional free speech issues participate in a 
circular problem.  Having little guidance from the state supreme court re-
garding the meaning of a state free speech provision apart from parallel 
federal analysis, attorneys themselves can do little more than cite federal 
precedents.
23
  This in turn leaves the state supreme court with little guid-




 20. The primacy approach was recently described by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in a sei-
zure case under the Fourth Amendment and New Hampshire‘s parallel provision: 
Since State v. Ball, we have consistently followed the ―primacy‖ approach to adjudication of 
constitutional issues.  This means that when a defendant specifically invokes the State Con-
stitution, we will consider those constitutional claims before addressing federal claims.  
Nonetheless, decisions from the United States Supreme Court are important in our State 
constitutional analysis.  We scrutinize these decisions and, if they are logically persuasive 
and well reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and policies underlying specific constitu-
tional guarantees, such decisions may properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when 
interpreting State constitutional guarantees. 
State v. Beauchesne, 151 N.H. 803, 807, 868 A.2d 972, 975–76 (2005). 
 21. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 704 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Ball not only 
expressed the plain statement prescribed by Long, but attempted to prospectively insulate state constitu-
tional interpretations from federal review: ―We hereby make clear that when this court cites federal or 
other State court opinions in construing provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution or statutes, we 
rely on those precedents merely for guidance and do not consider our results bound by those decisions.‖  
Ball, 124 N.H. at 233, 471 A.2d at 352.  Such a blanket disclaimer may be ineffective, given the Su-
preme Court‘s ―stated reluctance to look beneath or beyond the very state-court opinion at issue in 
order to answer the jurisdictional question . . . .‖  Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 33 (1995) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
 22. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 702 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The primacy approach was championed 
by Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court.  See Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Redisco-
vering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980); see also State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 
1316, 1318–23 (Or. 1983) (Linde, J.) (discussing at length the importance of addressing state constitu-
tional claims). 
  Some other states apply the ―interstitial‖ approach.  ―Under the interstitial approach, the court 
asks first whether the right being asserted is protected under the federal constitution.  If it is, then the 
state constitutional claim is not reached.  If it is not, then the state constitution is examined.‖  State v. 
Lujan, 175 P.3d 327, 329 (N.M. 2007) (quoting State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997)). 
 23. Cf. Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 583, 583 (1986) (discussing State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985), in which the 
Vermont Supreme Court ordered supplemental briefs to help it address the state constitutional issue). 
 24. Justice Souter, for one, has highlighted the important role of litigants: 
It is the need of every appellate court for the participation of the bar in the process of trying 
to think sensibly and comprehensively about the questions that the judicial power has been 
established to answer.  Nowhere is the need greater than in the field of State constitutional 
law, where we are asked so often to confront questions that have already been decided under 
the National Constitution.  If we place too much reliance on federal precedent we will rend-
er the State rules a mere row of shadows; if we place too little, we will render State practice 
incoherent.  If we are going to steer between these extremes, we will have to insist on devel-
oped advocacy from those who bring the cases before us. 
State v. Bradberry, 129 N.H. 68, 82–83, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (1986) (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
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more, post-Long, state supreme courts have a straightforward framework 
for analyzing state provisions first, in light of federal precedents, while 
making clear that the latter are cited merely as an analytical aid.  When 
dealing with state provisions interpreted to be at least as strong as their 
federal counterparts, the state supreme court will never need to conduct 
separate state and federal analyses.
25
  Consequently, when the court‘s dis-
positive state analysis relies on federal case law, the practitioner is left with 
no indication as to how parallel state and federal provisions might be inter-
preted differently. 
For a strong independent free speech jurisprudence to take hold in New 
Hampshire, the state supreme court will have to break this cycle, perhaps 
with the aid of a motivated litigant able to ground interpretation of Article 
22 firmly outside of federal precedents.
26
  This note seeks to provide such a  
foundation for the independent interpretation of free speech in Article 22 
of the New Hampshire Constitution. 
III.  THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 22 AND ITS FREE SPEECH PROVISION 
New Hampshire‘s constitution, as enacted in 1784, included no general 
guarantee of free speech.
27
  In addition to the free press provision in Article 
22, it included (and continues to include) a speech and debate clause for 
legislators
28
 and the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of 
  
 25. See, e.g., State v. Allard, 148 N.H. 702, 706, 813 A.2d 506, 510 (2002) (―Because our State 
Constitution provides at least as much protection as the Federal Constitution, we decide this case under 
State law only, considering cases from the federal courts only as an analytical aid.‖).  Moreover, where 
a state constitutional right is at least as strong as the corresponding federal right, the state constitutional 
analysis will be dispositive regardless of whether the court finds in favor of the party invoking the 
constitutional right.  For example, in HippoPress, LLC v. SMG, 150 N.H. 304, 312, 837 A.2d 347, 356 
(2003), the court found no state action as required for a violation of Article 22, and declined to pursue a 
separate First Amendment analysis ―[b]ecause the Federal Constitution affords HippoPress no greater 
protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances . . . .‖).  Where the party asserting 
the state constitutional right prevails in state court, the U.S. Supreme Court will decline review under 
Michigan v. Long.  Where the party asserting the state constitutional right loses in state court, and 
where the federal right is in fact no stronger than its state counterpart, the U.S. Supreme Court will not 
be able to provide relief. 
 26. See generally Donna M. Nakagiri, Developing State Constitutional Jurisprudence after Michi-
gan v. Long: Suggestions for Opinion Writing and Systemic Change, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. 
REV. 807 (1998). 
 27. Prior to the 1968 amendment, Part I, Article 22 read: ―Liberty of the Press is essential to the 
security of freedom in a State: It ought therefore to be inviolably preserved.‖  The earliest copies em-
ployed a semicolon rather than a colon. 
 28. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 30 (―The freedom of deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of 
the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any action, 
complaint, or prosecution, in any other court or place whatsoever.‖). 
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grievances.
29
  The New Hampshire Constitution‘s open government provi-
sion, amended in 1976 to provide that ―the public‘s right of access to go-
vernmental proceedings and records shall not be unreasonably restricted,‖ 
has also been read in tandem with Article 22 to protect publication of gov-
ernment records.
30
  Although understanding these provisions may be criti-
cal to resolving certain types of free speech cases, they are beyond the 
scope of this note. 
The 1964 New Hampshire Constitutional Convention yielded several 
proposed amendments, including the free speech amendment to Article 22, 
which was presented to the voters in 1968.  Garnering nearly 87% support, 
the amendment was, at the time, one of the most popular ever considered 
by New Hampshire voters.
31
  Among the eleven states which adopted char-
ters during the Revolutionary War, nine included liberty of the press, two 
also included free speech, and only two mentioned neither.
32
  New Hamp-
shire was not unique in adding free speech to its press clause, and today all 
fifty state charters recognize free speech and press.
33
 
A. Origin of the Language 
There is little doubt that New Hampshire‘s constitution, as proposed in 
1783 and ratified in 1784,
34
 was based on the 1780 Massachusetts Consti-
tution.
35
  Massachusetts‘s Article 16 originally read: ―The liberty of the 
  
 29. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 32 (―The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to 
assemble and consult upon the common good, give instructions to their representatives, and to request 
of the legislative body, by way of petition or remonstrance, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the 
grievances they suffer.‖). 
 30. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 8; see Associated Press v. State, 152 N.H. 120, 127–29, 888 A.2d 1236, 
1244–45 (2005).  
 31. See Bennett v. Thomson, 116 N.H. 453, 461–63, 363 A.2d 187, 193 (1976) (Kenison, C.J., 
dissenting).  For comparison, the 2006 amendment (now Part I, Article 12-a) to prohibit eminent do-
main for private use received 85.66% support.  In New Hampshire, an amendment needs to garner two-
thirds of the vote in order to be adopted.  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 100. 
 32. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 464, 465 n.64 
(1983). 
 33. Massachusetts added free speech to Article 16 of its declaration of rights in 1948.  Virginia‘s 
constitution first forbade the legislature from abridging ―the freedom of speech‖ in its 1830 constitu-
tion, but the protection was not added to free press in the bill of rights until the entire constitution was 
revised in 1971.  JOHN J. DINAN, THE VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 60 
(2005).  Maryland‘s constitution of 1776 originally declared ―[t]hat the liberty of the press ought to be 
inviolably preserved.‖  Its declaration of rights, as adopted in 1867, added this language: ―that every 
citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of that privilege.‖  DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: 
A REFERENCE GUIDE 45 (2005). 
 34. 9 N.H. STATE PAPERS 896, 901 (Nathaniel Bouton ed., 1875). 
 35. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 78 N.H. 617, 618, 100 A. 49, 50 (1917) (―The New Hampshire 
Bill of Rights is mainly a copy of the Massachusetts Bill of 1780 . . . .‖); SUSAN E. MARSHALL, THE 
NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 85 (2004); LYNN WARREN TURNER, 
THE NINTH STATE: NEW HAMPSHIRE‘S FORMATIVE YEARS 28 (1983). 
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press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought not, there-
fore, to be restrained in this commonwealth.‖36  Although the structure of 
Article 22 follows Massachusetts‘s original Article 16, New Hampshire‘s 
convention opted for stronger language: ―to be inviolably preserved‖ rather 
than ―not . . . to be restrained . . . .‖  This divergent language was not new, 
however, having been employed in Maryland‘s 1776 Declaration of 
Rights,
37
 and subsequently with minor variations in the Delaware Declara-
tion of Rights (1776)
38
 and South Carolina Constitution (1778).
39
 
John Adams drafted the Massachusetts Constitution, probably includ-
ing Article 16,
40
 but almost none of the wording from Adams‘s draft of the 
Massachusetts free press provision made it into Part I, Article 22 of the 
New Hampshire Constitution.
41
  The wording of the free press article gen-
erated by his drafting subcommittee matched that from the 1776 Pennsyl-
vania and 1777 Vermont Declarations of Rights: ―The people have a right 
to the freedom of speaking, writing, and publishing their sentiments.  The 
liberty of the press, therefore, ought not to be restrained.‖42  The Massa-
  
 36. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 16 (1780).  In 1948, a second sentence was added: ―The right of free 
speech shall not be abridged.‖  Id. amend. art. 77. 
 37. MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 40 (1776) (―That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably pre-
served.‖).  The article now includes a second sentence.  MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 40 (―That the liberty of 
the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, 
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.‖). 
 38. DEL. DECL. OF RTS. § 23 (1776) (―That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably pre-
served.‖).  The Delaware Constitution was subsequently revised by convention in 1792, resulting in a 
very different free press clause.  RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 25–26 (2002); see DEL. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 39. S.C. CONST. art. 43 (1778) (―That the liberty of the press be inviolably preserved.‖); cf. GA. 
CONST. art. 61 (1777) (―Freedom of the press and trial by jury to remain inviolate forever.‖).  Neither 
the South Carolina or Georgia constitutions still employ this same language.  See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 
2; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. 5. 
 40. John Adams, with Samuel Adams and James Bowdoin, served on a subcommittee in the 1779 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention assigned to draft the document.  ―[T]he other two picked 
[John] Adams to draw up the state‘s constitution.‖  DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 220 (2002); 
see RONALD M. PETERS, THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780: A SOCIAL COMPACT 21 
(1978). 
 41. Regarding the shorter article adopted by the Massachusetts convention, ―Much objection was 
made to it, among the people, as insufficient.‖  4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 227 n.2 (Charles Fran-
cis Adams ed., 1865); see also CLYDE AUGUSTIS DUNIWAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS 133, 134–36 (1906) (discussing the various objections and alternate pro-
posals during ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution). 
 42. DUNIWAY, supra note 41, at 133 (citing 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 41, at 227); 
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 40, at 221; PETERS, supra note 40, at 21.  Pennsylvania and Vermont were 
unique among the early states in their embrace of freedom of expression beyond the press.  Both states‘ 
constitutions also contained an additional press clause, apart from the one in their Declarations of 
Rights: ―The printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings 
of the legislature, or any part of government.‖  Anderson, supra note 32, at 465 (citing BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 273 (1971)).  The absence of free 
speech from other states‘ constitutions did not pass without notice, however.  For example, in Massa-
chusetts, Boston proposed the following language in place of Article 16: ―The Liberty of Speach and of 
the Press with respect to publick men and their Publick Conduct and Publick Measures, is essential to 
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chusetts convention substantially abridged Adams‘s language, stripping out 
any reference to free speech.
43
  New Hampshire‘s Article 22 should be 
viewed as a combination of the final Massachusetts preamble (―essential to 
the security of freedom in a state‖) and Maryland‘s command (―ought to be 
inviolably preserved‖).  Unfortunately, no records from New Hampshire‘s 
original constitutional conventions or ratification procedures remain.
44
 
B. Free Speech Case Law in New Hampshire 
1.  Pre-1968 
Free speech litigation in New Hampshire prior to 1968 is relatively 
sparse, but New Hampshire spawned a pair of landmark precedents regard-
ing free speech under the First Amendment.  In Cox v. New Hampshire,
45
 
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the state supreme court‘s ruling, estab-
lishing that a state‘s broad police powers allow time, place, and manner 
restrictions on speech consistent with the First Amendment.
46
  The U.S. 
Supreme Court again affirmed the state supreme court a year later in Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire,
47
 which established the ―fighting words‖ excep-
tion to the First Amendment based on a Jehovah‘s Witness who was ar-
  
the Security of Freedom in a State and shall not therefore be restrained in their Common Wealth.‖  A 
REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON CONTAINING THE BOSTON TOWN 
RECORDS, 1778 TO 1783, at 128 (1895).  Foreshadowing New Hampshire‘s approach nearly 200 years 
later, the town of Westford, Massachusetts proposed replacing the first clause with ―the Lyberty of the 
press and of speech are essential to the Security of Freedom in a State.‖  EDWIN R. HODGMAN, 
HISTORY OF THE TOWN OF WESTFORD 141 (1883). 
 43. The result was closer in form to a 1768 resolution passed by the Massachusetts House of Repre-
sentatives: ―The Liberty of the Press is a great Bulwark of the Liberty of the People: It is, therefore, the 
incumbent Duty of those who are constituted the Guardians of the People‘s Rights to defend and main-
tain it.‖  LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY 
AMERICAN HISTORY 69 (1960).  The resolution was adopted (by a vote of 56 to 18) following an at-
tempt by Governor Bernard to crack down on the Boston Gazette, a pro-independence paper which he 
described as ―an infamous weekly paper which has swarmed with Libells of the most atrocious kind.‖  
5 FREDERIC HUDSON ET AL., AMERICAN JOURNALISM, 1690–1940, at 75 (2000); accord JOSEPH 
WARREN, THE HUNDRED BOSTON ORATORS APPOINTED BY THE MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES AND OTHER 
PUBLIC BODIES 53 (1853). 
 44. See TURNER, supra note 35, at 21. 
 45. 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (affirming State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 16 A.2d 508 (1940)). 
 46. For a compelling argument that viewing states as endowed with plenary police powers under-
mines respect for state constitutions and individual rights, see Richard B. Sanders & Barbara Mahoney, 
Restoration of Limited State Constitutional Government: A Dissenter’s View, 59 N.Y.U ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 269, 269 (2003).  Under New Hampshire‘s constitution, which vests the legislature with ―full 
power and authority . . . to make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable or-
ders, laws, statutes, ordinances, directions, and instructions,‖ the advocated approach is likely a distinc-
tion without a difference.  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5. 
 47. 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (affirming State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 18 A.2d 754 (1941)).  Walter 
Chaplinsky was also a defendant in Cox, which considered a permit requirement for parades.  See Cox, 
91 N.H. at 137, 16 A.2d at 508. 
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rested after calling a police officer ―a goddamned racketeer‖ and ―a 




2.  Post-1968 
After the adoption of the 1968 free speech amendment, recognition of 
the new provision by the courts came very slowly.
50
  The first free speech 
case, State v. Hoskin, reached the state supreme court in 1972 following 
two convictions for obscuring the ―Live Free or Die‖ motto on the New 
Hampshire license plate.
51
  The Superior Court transferred ―the questions 
of law presented by the contentions of the defendants that imposition of 
criminal liability for their conduct exceeds the police power of the State, 
and that if construed to impose liability the statute violates rights guaran-
teed to the defendants by the State and Federal Constitutions.‖52  Yet nei-
ther the parties‘ briefs nor the court‘s opinion invoked the state constitu-
tion, relying only on the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
53
  The court 
swiftly rejected the defendants‘ federal free speech argument, concluding 
that the required display of the state motto was not unconstitutionally com-
pelled speech. 
After another New Hampshire defendant faced three convictions under 
the law upheld in Hoskin, he and his wife brought an action for declaratory 
and injunctive relief in federal district court to protect against future con-
victions.
54
  The district court accepted their argument (which substantially 
matched the one rejected in Hoskin) and issued ―an order enjoining the 
  
 48. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.  Notably, in 1987 the Oregon Supreme Court rejected Chaplinsky‘s 
support for the obscenity exception to free speech rights, finding that the state provision did not con-
template such an exception.  See State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 14–15 (Or. 1987).  For a critique of the 
Oregon high court‘s historical analysis, see Daniel R. Barnhart, The Oregon Bill of Rights and Obsceni-
ty: How Jurisprudence Confounded Constitutional History, 70 OR. L. REV. 907 (1991). 
 49. State v. Harvey, 108 N.H. 139, 140–41, 229 A.2d 176, 177–78 (1967); State v. Poulos, 97 N.H. 
53, 53, 88 A.2d 860, 861 (1952); State v. Derrickson, 97 N.H. 91, 93–94, 81 A.2d 312, 313–14 (1951). 
 50. Massachusetts‘s recognition of its 1948 free speech amendment came even more slowly, how-
ever, with the first citation by the Supreme Judicial Court not occurring until 1972.  First Nat‘l Bank of 
Boston v. Att‘y Gen., 290 N.E.2d 526, 536 (Mass. 1972). 
 51. State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 332, 295 A.2d 454, 455 (1972). 
 52. Id. at 332, 295 A.2d at 455. 
 53. See id. at 334–36, 295 A.2d at 456–57 (distinguishing the instant case from Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).  The defendants argued that the statute only pertained to the ―identify-
ing letters and figures‖ on the plates, that construing the statute more broadly brought it beyond the 
state‘s police power, that they had been denied equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
that ―prosecution of the defendants . . . infringes upon the right . . . to freedom of speech as guaranteed 
in the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.‖  Brief for Defendants at i, 
State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972) (No. 6354). 
 54. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707–09 (1977).  Given the recent state supreme court 
precedent, it‘s not surprising that the Maynards‘ ACLU attorney elected to pursue the case in federal 
court. 
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State ‗from arresting and prosecuting [The Maynards] at any time in the 
future for covering over that portion of their license plates that contains the 
motto ‗Live Free or Die.‘‖55  Following the State‘s appeal, the U.S. Su-
preme Court affirmed, finding that the state‘s interest in vehicle identifica-
tion could be ―more narrowly achieved,‖ and that ―where the State‘s inter-
est is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such 
interest cannot outweigh an individual‘s First Amendment right to avoid 
becoming the courier for such message.‖56 
A year after Hoskin, in 1973, the New Hampshire Supreme Court fi-
nally had occasion to recognize the existence of Article 22‘s new free 
speech provision.  In upholding the state‘s ―mob action‖ statute against 
vagueness and overbreadth challenges, the Court acknowledged that Ar-
ticle 22, along with Article 32
57
 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
―guarantee[s] the freedom of assembly and expression.‖58  In a 1974 case, 
the defendant raised, and thus the court addressed, the definition of obscen-
ity under only the federal Constitution.
59
  The following year, the state 
House of Representatives sought an opinion of the justices
60
 regarding the 
constitutionality—under both the state and federal constitutions—of a pro-
posed ban on schoolbooks containing obscenities.
61
  Again, the state su-




The prospects for free speech rights under Article 22 started to change 
in 1976, thanks to Chief Justice Kenison.
63
  The state director of resources 
  
 55. Id. at 709. 
 56. Id. at 716–17.  The state interests rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court had been accepted by the 
state supreme court in Hoskin, 112 N.H. at 335, 295 A.2d at 456 (―We cannot say that the legislature 
could not reasonably find that display of the State motto in the manner required would promote the 
general welfare by encouraging State pride and individualism through this reminder of its heritage.‖). 
 57. N.H. CONST. pt I, art. 32, quoted supra note 29, includes the right to petition. 
 58. State v. Albers, 113 N.H. 132, 137, 303 A.2d 197, 201 (1973). 
 59. State v. Harding, 114 N.H. 335, 342–43, 320 A.2d 646, 652 (1974) (upholding New Hamp-
shire‘s ban on the sale of obscene material, but ordering dismissal of prosecutions based on lack of fair 
warning to the defendants that the materials in question were obscene). 
 60. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the New Hampshire Supreme Court is authorized to issue advi-
sory opinions regarding ―important legal questions pending in, and awaiting consideration and action 
by, the body entitled to the advice in the course of its duty.‖  Opinion of the Justices, 115 N.H. 329, 
330, 340 A.2d 112, 114 (1975).  ―Each branch of the legislature as well as the governor and council 
shall have authority to require the opinions of the justices of the supreme court upon important ques-
tions of law and upon solemn occasions.‖  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 74. 
 61. Opinion of the Justices, 115 N.H. 226, 226, 337 A.2d 777, 777 (1975). 
 62. Id. at 227, 337 A.2d at 778 (finding the proposed law ―of doubtful constitutionality‖). 
 63. Chief Justice Kenison was undoubtedly familiar with free speech rights, having represented the 
state before the U.S. Supreme Court in Cox and Chaplinsky.  The attorney for the Governor and Execu-
tive Council in Bennett v. Thomson, David Brock, later became Chief Justice of the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court.  116 N.H. 453, 363 A.2d 187 (1976).  Justice Souter represented the state as Attorney 
General in Wooley v. Maynard, before being appointed to the state and then the federal Supreme Court.  
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and economic development was asked to resign after publicly criticizing 
Governor Thomson‘s support for a pulp mill in the Upper Connecticut 
River Valley.
64
  He petitioned directly to the state supreme court, arguing, 
inter alia, that his discharge violated his free speech rights under both the 
state and federal constitutions.
65
  As might have been expected, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court‘s majority opinion completely ignored the state 
constitution in analyzing the free speech rights of public employees.
66
  In 
dissent, however, Chief Justice Kenison included the court‘s longest-ever 
discussion of free speech under Article 22, a single paragraph dedicated to 
the adoption of the 1968 amendment.
67
  Kenison failed to elaborate on the 
significance of Article 22, simply declaring that ―[t]he constitutional com-
mand of the New Hampshire constitution and the first amendment to the 
United States Constitution does not permit the discharge of the plaintiff 
from State service on the grounds of insubordination in the circumstances 
of this case.‖68  Justice Grimes also dissented on constitutional grounds and 
mentioned Article 22, but he analyzed public employee free speech under 
federal case law only.
69
  Even though neither Justice Kenison nor Justice 
Grimes articulated an independent approach to free speech under Article 
22, it would be twenty years before any free speech litigant before the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court would again fail to raise Article 22.
70
 
Today, there are still no New Hampshire Supreme Court opinions indi-
cating that free speech rights under Article 22 are stronger than under the 
First Amendment, but the door remains open.
71
  Twice the Court has used 
the phrase ―at least as much protection‖ to describe the extent of Article 
22‘s protection relative to the First Amendment‘s.72  In each case, the 
Court fit the characterization into its Ball plain statement, obviating the 
  
430 U.S. 705 (1977).  Current New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Duggan represented the defen-
dant in State v. Nickerson.  120 N.H. 821, 424 A.2d 190 (1980). 
 64. Bennett, 116 N.H. at 454–56, 363 A.2d at 188–89. 
 65. Id. at 456, 363 A.2d at 189; see also Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at *12, Bennett, 429 
U.S. 1082 (1977) (No. 76-744). 
 66. Bennett, 116 N.H. at 456–60, 363 A.2d at 189–92 (―Bennett contends that his discharge on the 
basis of remarks made by him on matters of public concern violates his constitutional right to freedom 
of speech guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.‖). 
 67. Id. at 462, 363 A.2d at 193 (Kenison, C.J., dissenting). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 462–65, 363 A.2d at 193–95 (Kenison, C.J., and Grimes, J., dissenting) (applying Picker-
ing v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). 
 70. Several notable free speech opinions came down in the interim, including State v. Nickerson, 
striking down the state‘s disturbing the peace statute for overbreadth.  120 N.H. 821, 825, 424 A.2d 
190, 193 (1980). 
 71. But see Opinion of the Justices, 121 N.H. 434, 436, 430 A.2d 191, 193 (1981) (indicating that 
―the New Hampshire Constitution guarantees the same right to free speech and association‖ as the First 
Amendment in the context of campaign contribution restrictions). 
 72. State v. Allard, 148 N.H. 702, 706, 813 A.2d 506, 510 (2002) (Duggan, J.); Appeal of Booker, 
139 N.H. 337, 340, 653 A.2d 1084, 1086 (1995) (Brock, C.J.). 
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need for any interpretation of the First Amendment.
73
  In each case, how-
ever, the court proceeded to analyze the contested free speech rights—
employee speech and the right to make false statements to police offic-
ers—almost exclusively in light of federal case law. 
IV.  THE MEANING OF FREE SPEECH IN ARTICLE 22 
Judges and scholars have advocated a variety of approaches to state 
constitutional interpretation, including textual analysis, reliance on binding 
precedents and dicta, federal precedents, sister state opinions, historical 
analysis, and policy concerns.
74
  The New Hampshire Supreme Court has 
employed each of these approaches, but puts a particularly strong emphasis 
on original textual meaning: ―When interpreting a constitutional provision, 
‗we will look to its purpose and intent, bearing in mind that we will give 
the words in question the meaning they must be presumed to have had to 
the electorate when the vote was cast.‘‖75  The meaning of constitutional 
text must be discerned in light of the circumstances surrounding its adop-
tion.
76
  In the case of constitutional liberties, the historical understanding of 
a right prior to, during, and shortly following its enshrinement in the bill of 
rights has also received extensive treatment in some opinions.
77
  In cases 
where the history of adoption is unavailable, the court may look to the U.S. 
  
 73. ―Because our State Constitution provides at least as much protection as the Federal Constitution, 
we decide this case under State law only, considering cases from the federal courts only as an analytical 
aid.‖  Allard, 148 N.H. at 706, 813 A.2d at 510.  Recently, the Court found the federal precedent dispo-
sitive with regard to simulated child pornography, so it abandoned the primacy approach in favor of 
addressing the First Amendment first: 
[T]he defendant raises his claims under both the State and Federal Constitutions.  Our set-
tled rule is to first address the defendant‘s claims under the State Constitution, and cite fed-
eral opinions for guidance only.  Here, however, because United States Supreme Court pre-
cedents compel us to hold that criminalizing the defendant‘s mere possession of the images 
in question violates his First Amendment rights, and because we are required to follow fed-
eral constitutional law, an analysis under the State Constitution is unnecessary.  We there-
fore decide this case under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitu-
tion. 
State v. Zidel, 156 N.H. 684, 686, 940 A.2d 255, 257 (2008).  As noted above, under Long, this opens 
up the possibility of federal review. 
 74. See Robert I. Berdon, An Analytical Framework for Raising State Constitutional Claims in 
Connecticut, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191, 204 (1994) (state supreme court justice listing six approaches 
for arguing state constitutional claims identified in State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225 (Conn. 1992)). 
 75. In re Below, 151 N.H. 135, 139, 855 A.2d 459, 464 (2004) (quoting Opinion of Justices, 126 
N.H. 490, 495, 494 A.2d 261, 267 (1985)); accord Grinnell v. State, 121 N.H. 823, 826, 435 A.2d 523, 
525 (1981) (citing Keniston v. State, 63 N.H. 37, 37–38 (1884)).  
 76. Warburton v. Thomas, 136 N.H. 383, 386–87, 616 A.2d 495, 497–98 (1992) (citing Att‘y Gen. 
v. Morin, 93 N.H. 40, 43, 35 A.2d 513, 514 (1943)) (recounting the history of Part II, Article 44). 
 77. See, e.g., In re Estate of Dionne, 128 N.H. 682, 684–85, 518 A.2d 178, 179 (1986) (turning to 
Magna Carta for the meaning of the right to free justice). 
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Supreme Court or other state courts to illuminate the meaning of a particu-
lar term or provision, particularly where the language is identical.
78
 
A. Textual Meaning 
The text of Article 22 provides a useful starting point
79
 and framework 
for its analysis. 
1.  “essential to the security of freedom in a state” 
As the New Hampshire Supreme Court has observed, ―Our constitu-
tion quite consciously ties a free press to a free state, for effective self-
government cannot succeed unless the people have access to an unimpeded 
and uncensored flow of reporting.‖80  Yet this description probably unders-
tates the meaning of Article 22‘s justification clause.  The liberty of the 
press does not merely foster effective self-government—more importantly, 




 78. See, e.g., In re Juvenile 2003-195, 150 N.H. 644, 650, 843 A.2d 318, 324 (2004) (citing to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to aid in interpreting New Hampshire‘s identical confrontation 
clause); Warburton, 136 N.H. at 390, 616 A.2d at 499 (―Early constitutional interpretation is entitled 
great weight in determining the framers‘ intent, especially when the framers later serve in one of the 
branches of government.‖); State v. Pinder, 128 N.H. 66, 71–73, 514 A.2d 1241, 1244–1246 (1986) 
(citing opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the supreme courts of Mississippi and Kentucky to aid 
in defining ―possessions‖ in part I, article 19‘s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures); State 
v. Settle, 123 N.H. 34, 38, 455 A.2d 1031, 1034 (1983) (interpreting Part I, Article 15, regarding the 
right to represent oneself in court): 
We have been unable to find any legislative history to indicate the Framers‘ intent when this 
article was adopted.  There are no cases discussing the meaning of the article.  Other courts, 
interpreting similar constitutional provisions, have concluded that the language was in-
tended to guarantee the right to represent oneself, or to be represented by counsel but that it 
was not intended to guarantee the right to represent oneself and be represented by counsel 
simultaneously. 
 79. See State v. Roache, 148 N.H. 45, 49, 803 A.2d 572, 576 (2002) (―[W]e look to the text, our 
prior interpretations . . . , and the reasoning of those courts that have interpreted similar constitutional 
language.‖). 
 80. Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 386, 389, 373 A.2d 644, 647 (1977). 
 81. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 124 (2d ed. 2001) (describing the free 
press as ―an informal or extraconstitutional fourth branch that functioned as part of the intricate system 
of checks and balances that exposed public mismanagement and kept power fragmented, manageable, 
and accountable‖); Anderson, supra note 32, at 496–97 (―[I]f the press clause was not intended even to 
protect press criticisms of government, we can assume a fortiori that it was not intended to protect such 
exotics as confidentiality of sources or editorial autonomy.  On the other hand, if the press clause was 
viewed as providing an essential check on government, then the claim to these additional rights may be 
far more plausible.‖); Martin J. Rooney, Freedom of the Press: An Emerging Privilege, 67 MARQ. L. 
REV. 33, 56–58 (1984) (discussing the role of the press as an ―independent check on the government‖).  
But see The Press, in 3  THE NEW-YORK REVIEW 296, 302–03 (Francis Lister Hawks et al. eds., 1838): 
When it is said that ―the liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state,‖ 
is it meant that freedom cannot exist in a state, unless every one may, with legal impunity, 
calumniate and blacken whomsoever he pleases—destroy man, and blaspheme God?  No 
state can exist, where there is such freedom. 
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The prefatory clause in Article 22 comes directly from the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights, ratified in 1780.  Although the precise wording 
employed by Massachusetts was original, the concept was not.
82
  Black-
stone‘s oft-cited Commentaries of 1769, although expressing a narrow 
interpretation of the right, stated, ―The liberty of the press is indeed essen-
tial to the nature of a free state . . . .‖83  The prior year, 1768, the Massa-
chusetts House described the liberty of the press as ―a great Bulwark of the 
Liberty of the People.‖84  The ―bulwark‖ concept, also employed by 
George Mason in the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights,
85
 dates back at 
least to 1720 and underscores the importance of the liberty of the press as a 
safeguard of other liberties.
86
 
Unlike the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which refers 
to the security of a free state, Article 22 refers directly to the security of 
freedom in a state.  ―In eighteenth-century political discourse, ‗free state‘ 
was a commonly used political term of art, meaning ‗free country,‘ which 
is to say the opposite of a despotism.‖87  Free speech and liberty of the 
press are not merely conducive to functioning democracy, but are indis-
pensible preservatives of other liberties—i.e., they are safeguards against 




John Adams himself (who went on as President to infamously support the Alien and Sedition Acts) 
expressed concerns during the Revolution that liberty of the press might be used to destroy rather than 
protect liberty.  DUNIWAY, supra note 41, at 143 (citing 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 41, 
at 31–32). 
 82. ―The press, when open to all parties and influenced by none, is a salutary engine in a free state, 
perhaps a necessary one to preserve the freedom of that state . . . .‖  Massachusettensis, Letter to the 
Inhabitants of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay (Dec. 12, 1774), reprinted in JOHN ADAMS & 
JONATHAN SEWALL, NOVANGLUS, AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS; OR POLITICAL ESSAYS, PUBLISHED IN 
THE YEARS 1774 AND 1775, ON THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF CONTROVERSY, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN 
AND HER COLONIES 141 (1819); see also 2 THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND 102 & n.1 (1863) (attributing the origin of the concept of free speech to Socrates, Demos-
tenes, and Euripides). 
 83. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 152 (1769), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs4.html. 
 84. Anderson, supra note 32, at 463. 
 85. VA. DECL. OF RTS. § 12 (1776) (―That the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of 
liberty and can never be restrained but by despotic governments.‖). 
 86. The wording of the 1768 resolution appears to have been derived from a 1720 letter by Cato, the 
pseudonym for two English journalists, which proclaimed that ―Freedom of speech is the great bulwark 
of liberty; they prosper and die together . . . .  Freedom of speech, therefore, being of such infinite 
importance to the preservation of liberty, every one who loves liberty ought to encourage freedom of 
speech.‖  See Anderson, supra note 32, at 463, 490–91 (citing 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS 
GORDON, CATO‘S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND OTHER IMPORTANT 
SUBJECTS 96–103 (1755)). 
 87. Eugene Volokh, “Necessary to the Security of a Free State,” 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 
(2007). 
 88. See id. at 9 (equating ―free state‖ as used by Blackstone with ―freedom in a state‖ in the Massa-
chusetts Constitution); WEBSTER‘S DICTIONARY (1828) (defining ―security‖ as ―[p]rotection; effectual 
defense or saftey from danger of any kind; as a chain of forts erected for the security of the frontiers‖). 
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The recent landmark Second Amendment case, District of Columbia v. 
Heller,
89
 offers some guidance on the proper treatment of Article 22‘s pre-
fatory clause. 
Logic demands that there be a link between the stated purpose 
and the command. . . .  That requirement of logical connection may 
cause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the operative 
clause . . . .  But apart from that clarifying function, a prefatory 
clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.
90
 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has already implied that Article 22‘s 
prefatory clause bolsters the force of the operative clause.
91
  Clearly, the 
importance of the rights as expressed in the prefatory clause accords with 
the strong command that they be ―inviolably preserved.‖  In adjudicating 
free speech cases, the balancing of the right against other rights and go-
vernmental interests necessarily injects a degree of ambiguity; that the New 
Hampshire Bill of Rights recognizes free speech as ―essential to the securi-




2.  “ought” 
Free speech in Article 22, as with many other state constitutional 
rights,
93
 including liberty of the press in the Massachusetts constitution,
94
 
relies on the aspirational term ―ought‖ rather than the imperative ―shall.‖95  
  
  A free press, like an armed citizenry, stands as a check on despotic government.  See supra note 
81; cf. Michael I. Garcia, The “Assault Weapons” Ban, The Second Amendment, and The Security of a 
Free State, 6 REGENT U. L. REV. 261, 270 (1995) (―[A] Militia, composed of armed and free citizens, 
would actually threaten the security of a tyrannical slave state or a police state.‖). 
 89. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 90. Id. at 2789 (citations omitted); see also id. at 2789 n.3 (―[I]n America ‗the settled principle of 
law is that the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where the enacting part 
is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms.‘‖  (quoting JABEZ SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 47.04 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed.1992))). 
 91. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 386, 389, 
373 A.2d 644, 647 (1977)). 
 92. See WEBSTER‘S DICTIONARY (1828) (defining ―essential‖ as ―[n]ecessary to the constitution or 
existence of a thing‖). 
 93. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 9 (―excessive bail ought not to be required‖); DEL. CONST. art. I, § 
1 (―no person shall or ought to be compelled to attend any religious worship‖). 
 94. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 16 (―The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a 
state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth.  The right of free speech shall not 
be abridged.‖). 
 95. Cf. PETERS, supra note 40, at 46 (describing the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights): 
The Declaration of Rights . . . consists of thirty articles which are so various as to almost de-
fy any attempt to render an orderly account of them.  Some [articles] are simple assertions . . 
. .  Others are commands . . . .  Still others appear to be recommendations.  Article XVI 
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In early American history, this linguistic choice may have reflected the 
view that ―[b]ills of rights . . . provid[ed] a statement of broad principles 
rather than a set of legally enforceable rights.‖96  Even though the concept 
of judicial review was explicitly recognized in several state constitutions, 
the judiciary‘s future role in constitutional rights could not have been fully 
appreciated.  Alexander Hamilton, for instance, embraced judicial review 
in The Federalist No. 78,
97
 but in The Federalist No. 84 ridiculed the utili-
ty of a federal bill of rights, citing the liberty of the press as a useless pro-
vision in state constitutions.
98
  (New Hampshire‘s 57–47 vote, in 1788, to 
  
reads: ―The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought not 
therefore, to be restrained in this Commonwealth.‖ 
 96. Donald S. Lutz, Political Participation in Eighteenth-Century America, 53 ALB. L. REV. 327, 
331 & nn. 18–19 (1988–1989) (―It is for this reason that they were more often than not couched in 
admonitory language using words like ‗should‘ and ‗ought‘ rather than the legally binding ‗shall‘ and 
‗will.‘‖).  The first nine amendments to the U.S. Constitution use the word ―shall,‖ a total of sixteen 
times.  Even though some states‘ proposed amendments used the word ―ought,‖ Charles Pinckney‘s 
proposed amendments in 1787 and Madison‘s proposed amendments from 1791 relied on ―shall.‖  THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
445 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1876).  Pinckney‘s proposed amendments included: ―The liberty of the press 
shall be inviolably preserved.‖  Id.  Roger Sherman spoke against the proposed amendment on the 
ground that ―[t]he power of Congress does not extend to the Press,‖ and the amendment was rejected.  
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 617–18 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 97. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton): 
By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to 
the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex 
post facto laws, and the like.  Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other 
way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts 
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.  Without this, all the reservations of 
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. 
 98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added): 
In the first place, I observe that there is not a syllable concerning it in the constitution of this 
state, and in the next, I contend that whatever has been said about it in that of any other 
state, amounts to nothing.  What signifies a declaration that “the liberty of the press shall be 
inviolably preserved?”  What is the liberty of the press?  Who can give it any definition 
which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?  I hold it to be impracticable; and 
from this, I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any consti-
tution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of 
the people and of the government.  And here, after all, as intimated upon another occasion, 
must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights. 
. . . . 
I know not by what logic it could be maintained that the declarations in the state con-
stitutions, in favour of the freedom of the press, would be a constitutional impediment to the 
imposition of duties upon publications by the state legislatures. . . .  And if duties of any 
kind may be laid without a violation of that liberty, it is evident that the extent must depend 
on legislative discretion, regulated by public opinion; so that after all, general declarations 
respecting the liberty of the press will give it no greater security than it will have without 
them.  The same invasions of it may be effected under the state constitutions which contain 
those declarations through the means of taxation, as under the proposed constitution which 
has nothing of the kind.  It would be quite as significant to declare that government ought to 
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ratify the federal Constitution was secured with a recommendation of 
twelve amendments, which addressed ―rights of Conscience‖ but not free 
speech or press directly.
99
) 
Nevertheless, in considering ratification of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion, some towns ―urged the alteration of ‗ought not‘ to ‗shall not,‘ because 
the ‗strongest and most definite expressions should be adopted.‘‖100  When 
―the right of free speech‖ was added to Massachusetts‘s Article 16 in 1948, 
it was accompanied by the imperative ―shall,‖ while ―the liberty of the 
press‖ retained the less adamant ―ought.‖101  The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court has not so much as noted this distinction. 
New Hampshire has never treated the word ―ought‖ in its Bill of 
Rights as inferior to the word ―shall.‖102  Nothing from the 1964 Conven-
tion indicates that the matter was even considered, and today in New 




3.  “inviolably preserved” 
The text of Article 22 differs significantly from that of the First 
Amendment: ―Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .‖104  It also diverges from that of its sister, the 1780 Massachu-
  
―We, the people of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America.‖  This 
is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the 
principal figure in several of our state bills of rights. 
Id. (quoted by Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, 200 (1882)). 
 99. See PATRICK T. CONLEY & JOHN P. KAMINSKI, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE 
COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 162–63 (1992) (discussing New 
Hampshire‘s ratification convention of 1788); TURNER, supra note 35, at 78 (citing 10 N.H. STATE 
PAPERS, supra note 34, at 17–18). 
 100. DUNIWAY, supra note 41, at 135 (quoting from the Town of Lexington).  Lexington‘s resolution 
continued, ―and we cannot but think that the Words—It shall not, are more full, expressive and definite 
than the Words, ‗It ought not.‘‖  Id. 
 101. MASS. CONST. amend. art. 77. 
 102. Compare State v. Spiritous Liquors, 68 N.H. 47, 48, 40 A. 398, 399 (1894) (describing N.H. 
CONST. pt. I, art. 19, ―no warrant ought to be issued but in cases and with the formalities prescribed by 
law,‖ as ―a simple affirmation of the common law‖), with State v. Foster, 80 N.H. 1, 7, 114 A. 277, 277 
(1921) (―It is probable that [N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 18] is merely directory; but, assuming that it is 
mandatory, and that all punishments must be ‗proportioned‘ to the nature of the offence, it does not 
help the defendant . . . .‖). 
 103. See, e.g., State v. Johanson, 156 N.H. 148, 152, 932 A.2d 848, 854 (2007) (interpreting N.H. 
CONST. pt. I, art. 17, which reads in relevant part: ―In criminal prosecutions, the trial of facts, in the 
vicinity where they happened, is so essential to the security of the life, liberty and estate of the citizen, 
that no crime or offence ought to be tried in any other county than that in which it is committed . . . .‖). 
 104. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, TOUCHING 
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS 139 (1850): 
Now the people of Virginia, in their state constitution, appear to have been as jealous of this 
freedom of the press, as were the people of the United States in the formation of the Federal 
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setts Constitution, by ―plac[ing] a higher emphasis on liberty of the press, 
demanding that it be ‗inviolably preserved‘ as opposed to ‗not . . . re-
strained.‘‖105  As noted above, while New Hampshire embraced the struc-
ture of the Massachusetts article, it elected Maryland‘s stronger wording, 
which should be read as expressing greater concern for the right.
106
 
There are cases where state constitutional rights compete against one 
another, and the strong language in Article 22 could be used to justify giv-
ing priority to free speech.
107
  In one instance, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court hinted that it would not be so predisposed with regard to find-
ing a general constitutional right to disseminate information from a juve-
nile court proceeding.
108
  Interestingly, it cited the U.S. Supreme Court‘s 
holding that the press‘s right to publish the information enjoys First 
Amendment protection, but indicated that the press may enjoy greater pro-
tection than others who ―give such information to the media.‖109 
Given the prevalence of balancing tests in free speech case law
110
 and 
adjudication of other constitutional rights,
111
 ―inviolably‖ carries strong 
  
Constitution.  For if the Constitution of the United States declares, that Congress shall 
―make no law abridging the freedom of speech or the press,‖ the Constitution of Virginia, in 
the twelfth article of the bill of rights, declares, ―that the freedom of the press is one of the 
great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments.‖ 
 105. MARSHALL, supra note 35, at 85.  Other state constitutions, including Pennsylvania‘s, use the 
same approach of ―inviolability.‖  See Seth F. Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of 
Free Expression, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 12, 18 (citing the Declaration of Rights from Pennsylvania‘s 
1790 Constitution: ―Everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government, and 
shall for ever remain inviolate.‖). 
 106. But see State v. Read, 680 A.2d 944, 952 (Vt. 1996) (―Defendant provides no comparison to 
similar state constitutions, and thus invites us to resolve his constitutional claim based only upon an 
inference drawn from dissimilar state constitutions.  We decline defendant‘s invitation.‖).  With Article 
22, the comparison to Massachusetts‘s language carries weight not simply for ―sibling state‖ analysis, 
but for illuminating the meaning of the article to its drafters and adopters. 
 107. Cf. Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 1324, 1415 (1982) (citation omitted): 
Some have argued that constitutional rights run not against private parties, but against the 
state; if the state cannot pursue a course of action without infringing upon either of two 
rights, it must abandon the action rather than violate either right.  For example, a state con-
stitution might warrant extending a testimonial privilege to a reporter in a case in which the 
extension of such a privilege would violate the federal right of a defendant to compulsory 
process.  According to this view, the correct result would be not to narrow the state speech 
right to conform with the federal right, but to dismiss the prosecution unless a procedural 
accommodation could be found that would preserve both rights. 
 108. In re Werme‘s Case, 150 N.H. 351, 354, 839 A.2d 1, 3 (2003).  In this instance, the right to free 
speech failed against a statutory right to privacy.  See In re Brianna B., 785 A.2d 1189, 1195 (Conn. 
App. 2001) (cited by In re Werme’s Case). 
 109. In re Werme’s Case, 150 N.H. at 354, 839 A.2d at 3. 
 110. See KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 78–79 (2004) (outlining free speech analysis under the First Amendment and describing 
different levels of scrutiny). 
 111. See, e.g., Alonzi v. Northeast Generation Servs. Co., 156 N.H. 656, 662, 940 A.2d 1153, 1159 
(2008) (describing levels of scrutiny applicable to equal protection challenges). 
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implications.  Unless ―inviolably‖ in Article 22 is surplusage, the term 
elevates speech and press above other interests.  Where the right to free 
speech is weighed against other rights or interests, the presumption ought 
to thus be strongly in favor of free speech.  This is not to say that the rights 
in Article 22 should be read as absolutes—rather, once the general extent 
of protected activity
112
 is understood, it should not be readily circum-
scribed. 
The New Hampshire approach (―inviolably preserved‖) may mean 
more than emphatic insistence on the importance of the liberty of the press.  
First, as was commonly (though not universally) understood in the eigh-
teenth century, liberty of the press referred only to a lack of prior re-
straints.
113
  Whereas Massachusetts‘s Article 16 referred arguably only to 
such restraints, the New Hampshire wording allows for a more expansive 
reading.  Support for this distinction can be found in the federal amend-
ment proposed by New York, which had no bill of rights of its own: ―Free-
dom of the Press ought not to be violated or restrained.‖114  That is, free-
dom of the press could conceivably be ―violated‖ by something other than 
a prior restraint; the Massachusetts Constitution might tolerate such a vi-
olation, but New Hampshire‘s would not.115  The scope of free speech and 
the liberty of the press in relation to prior restraints is discussed further 
below. 
Article 22 does not technically grant the rights of free speech and free 
press, but declares that they must be ―preserved.‖116  Should the rights thus 
  
 112. ―Th[e First] [A]mendment, then, we may take it for granted, does not forbid the abridging of 
speech.  But, at the same time, it does forbid the abridging of the freedom of speech.‖  ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT 19 (1948) (cited by Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 382 (1974) (White, J., dissenting)), available at 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/UW/UW-
idx?type=goto&id=UW.MeikFreeSp&isize=M&page=19.  To say that Article 22 protects ―free 
speech‖ rather than ―speech‖ only begs the question—what is the extent of the protected right?  See id. 
(characterizing the distinction as a ―paradox‖); infra note 176 (questioning the distinction). 
 113. See infra note 124 & accompanying text. 
 114. See David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429, 440 & 
n.52 (1983); see also CONN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (―No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the  
liberty of speech or of the press.‖); ME. CONST. art. I, § 4 (―no laws shall be passed regulating or re-
straining the freedom of the press‖). 
 115. Bogen, supra note 114, at 440 n.52 (―The disjunctive indicates that something other than re-
straint would be a violation of freedom of the press.‖). 
 116. Massachusetts‘s parallel provision was viewed as ―merely declaratory of the law as it had ex-
isted for nearly sixty years, with an added prohibition of any possible reestablishment of censorship.‖  
DUNIWAY, supra note 41, at 143.  Constitutional rights, at least today, carry more weight than common 
law rights, and presumably the American people who called for state and federal bills of rights did not 
believe they were advocating superfluity.  See id. at 141 n.1 (noting Massachusetts newspapers‘ recog-
nition of their ―fortunate legal position‖ relative to England‘s mere common law ―freedom of discus-
sion‖ rights).  A similar sentiment was expressed in Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 400 (1873), which 
described ―the right of defence‖ recognized in Article 2: ―Long upheld by the common law, it has, 
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be construed as they were perceived when the article and its amendment 
were enacted?  This conclusion would be consistent with New Hamp-
shire‘s approach to constitutional interpretation117 and would fit neatly with 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court‘s 1888 pronouncement concerning the 
relationship between constitutional rights and the preexisting common law: 
―That a bill of rights . . . is a reservation and not a grant, was a point on 
which there could be no difference of opinion.‖118  Comparable constitu-
tional provisions, most notably the Seventh Amendment (―the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved‖), have been treated this way.119 
Any distinction between preserving, protecting, maintaining, or 
upholding a right, or the like, must be made in light of the circumstances 
surrounding the 1968 amendment, when New Hampshire‘s people already 
enjoyed free speech protection through incorporation of the First Amend-
ment.  If Article 22 was meant to enshrine a preexisting common law right, 
the interpretive challenge is to understand that right at the time of adoption, 
but when the free speech amendment was ratified in 1968, free speech 
should not have been understood as merely an ancient common law right.  
At the same time, in order for free speech to be ―inviolably preserved‖ as 
Article 22 requires, no restrictions beyond the common law (e.g., defama-
tion) and statutory limitations on speech existing in 1968 should escape 
constitutional scrutiny. 
  
under the administration of that law, theoretically been what it was before; and now, reinforced by a 
constitutional guaranty, it is what it has always been.‖ 
 117. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text; see also Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 138 
N.H. 183, 186, 635 A.2d 1375, 1377–78 (1993) (quotations omitted, alterations in original): 
In interpreting an article in our constitution, we will give the words the same meaning that 
they must have had to the electorate on the date the vote was cast.  In doing so, we must 
place [ourselves] as nearly as possible in the situation of the parties at the time the instru-
ment was made, that [we] may gather their intention from the language used, viewed in the 
light of the surrounding circumstances. 
 118. Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, 200 (1882).  The court continued: 
It was universally understood by the founders of our institutions that jury trial, and the other 
usual provisions of bills of rights, were not grants of rights to the public body politic, but 
reservations of private rights of the subject, paramount to all governmental authority; and 
this constitutional principle has never been abandoned. 
Id. 
 119. Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 
639, 639–40 (1973) (―For at least the past century and a half, judicial and academic writings on the 
right to jury trial afforded by the seventh amendment have uniformly agreed on one central proposition: 
in determining whether the seventh amendment requires that a jury by called to decide the case the 
court must be guided by the practice of English courts in 1791.‖); accord Chauffeurs, Teamsters & 
Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1990) (discussing preservation of the right to a 
jury trial in the Seventh Amendment); id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Smith v. State, 118 N.H. 
764, 768–69, 394 A.2d 834, 838 (1978); see also State ex. rel. Rhodes v. Saunders, 66 N.H. 39, 90, 25 
A. 588, 590 (1889) (finding that New Hampshire‘s original jury trial provision in part I, article 20, 
which read in part ―except in cases in which it has been heretofore otherwise used and practiced, the 
parties have a right to a trial by jury,‖ merely secured the common law right existing in 1784). 
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Because New Hampshire‘s people already enjoyed a federal free 
speech right in 1968 (and in 1964, when the amendment was authored), the 
choice to amend Article 22—with the ―preserved‖ language—could clearly 
be read as an attempt to freeze the right at that point in time.  This is a var-
iation on the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, by which a lawmaking 
body is deemed to have assented to a prior interpretation through either 
inaction or reenactment of statutory language.
120
  Although legislative ac-
quiescence is a strongly and justifiably disfavored interpretive tool in cases 
of legislative inaction,
121
 here New Hampshire voters actively embraced 
the recognition of free speech in their own state‘s constitution.  Even if not 
intended to afford greater protection than the First Amendment, Article 22 
as amended would continue to protect free speech rights in the event that 
First Amendment rights were to recede through new U.S. Supreme Court 




4.  “free speech and liberty of the press” 
Although ―free speech‖ and ―liberty of the press‖ enjoy the same lin-
guistic treatment in Article 22 and mostly parallel judicial treatment by the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court, their historical meanings cannot easily be 
reconciled.  As understood by Blackstone and most other jurists up through 
the nineteenth century, liberty of the press encompasses the absence of 
  
 120. See Tomson v. Ward, 1 N.H. 9, 12 (N.H. Super. 1816) (―It is an established legal maxim, that 
when the legislature adopt or re-enact a statute, the previous construction of the statute as settled by the 
courts of law is adopted . . . .‖); see also Note, Legislative Adoption of Prior Judicial Construction: The 
Girouard Case and the Reenactment Rule, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1277, n.7 (1946). 
  In 1984, New Hampshire voters approved part I, article 2-a, protecting the right to keep and bear 
arms.  Unlike free speech, the amendment occupies its own article in part I.  Citing Article 22, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court has indicated that under article 2-a ―the right to bear arms is no more abso-
lute than the right of free speech.‖  State v. Smith, 132 N.H. 756, 758, 571 A.2d 279, 281 (1990).  
Article 2-a, while straightforward, lacks the forceful language of Article 22: ―All persons have the right 
to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves, their families, their property and the state.‖  N.H. 
CONST. pt. I, art. 2-a. 
 121. See United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002). 
 122. As expressed in the amendment‘s voters‘ guide, infra note 136, ―as a matter of our state‘s self-
respect and good constitutional law, we should not be dependent on the federal government for the 
protection of this basic personal liberty.‖ 
  Admittedly, in the 1960s, incorporation was less a fixture of American jurisprudence than it is 
today.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), indicated the Supreme Court‘s willingness to apply 
the First Amendment to state government actions, and the Court first upheld a personal liberty claim 
under the First and Fourteenth amendments two years later, in Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).  
HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 50–52 (7th ed. 1998).  Revers-
ing a decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the exclusio-
nary rule to the states by way of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but there were three dissen-
ters.  Id. at 59.  In 1965, two Justices disputed the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment in Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
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prior restraints,
123
 as opposed to immunity from punishment after words 
have been printed.
124
  Prior restraints were certainly loathed in eighteenth-
century America.  In 1785 Massachusetts imposed a stamp tax on newspa-
pers and almanacs, startlingly similar to the British stamp tax, but public 
outcry led to its repeal the following year.
125
  Modern scholarship has de-
bated the proper scope of liberty of the press,
126
 although some historical 
  
 123. See generally Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpreta-
tions, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (1987).  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has explained: 
It was with a wise regard to these evils, that the common law has put a check upon the licen-
tiousness of the press, and the expression of opinion by writing, painting, &c. when the ef-
fect and object is to blacken the character of any one, or to disturb his comfort . . . . 
Nor does our constitution or declaration of rights abrogate the common law in this re-
spect, as some have insisted.  The 16th article declares, that ―the liberty of the press is es-
sential to the security of freedom in a state; it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this 
commonwealth.‖  The liberty of the press, not its licentiousness; this is the construction 
which a just regard to the other parts of that instrument, and to the wisdom of those who 
formed it, requires.  In the 11th article it is declared, that every ―subject of the common-
wealth ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or 
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character.‖  And thus the general 
declaration in the 16th article is qualified.  Besides, it is well understood, and received as a 
commentary on this provision for the liberty of the press, that it was intended to prevent all 
such previous restraints upon publications as had been practised by other governments, and 
in early times here, to stifle the efforts of patriots towards enlightening their fellow subjects 
upon their rights and the duties of rulers.  The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but 
he who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, 
which does not protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction. 
Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 314 (1825). 
 124. JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF WORDS AND PHRASES 4131 (1904) (citing Blanding, 
20 Mass. 304); Smith, supra note 123, at 460; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 705–07 (1987 reprint of 1833 abridgement) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1769)): 
Mr. Justice Blackstone has remarked, that the liberty of the press, properly understood, 
is essential to the nature of a free state ; but that this consists in laying no previous restraints 
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter, when published.  
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; 
to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press.  But, if he publishes what is improper, 
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity. . . . 
The doctrine laid down by Mr. Justice Blackstone, respecting the liberty of the press, 
has not been repudiated (as far as is known) by any solemn decision of any of the state 
courts, in respect to their own municipal jurisprudence.  On the contrary, it has been repeat-
edly affirmed in several of the states, notwithstanding their constitutions, or laws recognize, 
that ―the liberty of the press ought not to be restrained,‖ or more emphatically, that ―the li-
berty of the press shall be inviolably maintained.‖ 
Accord Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N.H. 137, 151 (1860) (―The liberty of the press is not endangered by the 
punishment of libelous publications.‖); see also Krebiozen Research Found. v. Beacon Press, Inc., 134 
N.E.2d 1, 7–8 (Mass. 1956) (discussing the original meaning of liberty of the press); LEONARD W. 
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 106 (2d ed. 2001). 
 125. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248 (1936) (citing DUNIWAY, supra note 41, at 
136 n.2). 
 126.   See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714–15 (1931) (―The criticism upon Blackstone‘s state-
ment has not been because immunity from previous restraint upon publication has not been regarded as 
deserving of special emphasis, but chiefly because that immunity cannot be deemed to exhaust the 
conception of the liberty guaranteed by State and Federal Constitutions.‖).  Compare LEONARD W. 
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documents suggest that the right was understood as something broader than 
a lack of prior restraints or licensure of the press.
127
  To limit free speech 
rights to the absence of prior restraints would drastically restrict them, and 
the historical regulation of printers does not easily analogize to speech 
regulation—as a practical matter, how could the government require prior 
approval of speech as it could with printed material.
128
  Of course, time, 
place, and manner jurisprudence expressly allows prior restraints on speech 




One way to evaluate the meaning of the free speech provision in Ar-
ticle 22 is to study its antecedent free press provision.  Here, at least in the 
area of a press shield against revealing sources, the state supreme court has 
forcefully articulated an interpretation of Article 22 stronger than the First 
Amendment: 
In Branzburg v. Hayes, the [U.S.] supreme court rejected by a 
five to four margin the proposition that a reporter‘s privilege ex-
isted when faced with inquiries before a grand jury. . . . 
However, . . . the court made clear that it was ―powerless to 
bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing 
their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, 
either qualified or absolute.‖ The New Hampshire Constitution, 
part I, article 22 provides that ―liberty of the press‖ is ―essential to 
the security of freedom in a state‖ and ought, therefore, ―to be in-
violably preserved.‖ 
  
LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON (1967) (arguing that freedom of the press 
merely prohibits prior restraints), with Anderson, supra note 33 (advocating a broader interpretation). 
 127. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, Of the Liberty of the Press, in 1 ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON SEVERAL 
SUBJECTS 6, 8 (2d ed. 1758) (first emphasis added): 
Nothing can impose a farther restraint, but either the clapping an IMPRIMATUR upon the 
press, or the giving to the court very large discretionary powers to punish what displeases 
them.  But these concessions would be such a bare-faced violation of liberty, that they will 
probably be the last efforts of a despotic government.  We may conclude, that the liberty of 
Britain is gone for ever when these attempts shall succeed. 
Nevertheless, around this time in the colonies it was risky business to publish any criticism of the 
government.  See, e.g., 1 ISAIAH THOMAS, THE HISTORY OF PRINTING IN AMERICA 129–32 (2d ed. 
1874) (describing one printer‘s plight, in 1754, for libel of the Massachusetts General Court). 
 128. See Bogen, supra note 114, at 440 n.52 (suggesting that protection from prior restraints does not 
make sense in the context of speech).  But cf. State v. Chong, 121 N.H. 860, 861, 435 A.2d 538, 539 
(1981) (―Prior restraints are inherently suspect because they threaten the fundamental right to free 
speech.‖). 
 129. ―The state has authority to make regulations as to the time, mode, and circumstances under 
which parties shall assert, enjoy, or exercise their rights, without coming in conflict with any of those 
constitutional principles which are established for the protection of private rights and private property.‖  
State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 141, 16 A.2d 508, 512 (1940) (citing State v. White, 64 N.H. 48, 50, 5 A. 
828, 830 (1886)). 
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Our constitution quite consciously ties a free press to a free 
state, for effective self-government cannot succeed unless the 
people have access to an unimpeded and uncensored flow of re-
porting. News gathering is an integral part of the process. . . . 
We hold only that in this civil proceeding involving the press 
as a nonparty, the balance is struck in favor of the press.
130
 
Although the New Hampshire Supreme Court retreated closer to the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s approach to the press shield in subsequent cases,131 this 
judicially created shield
132
 remains good law and offers a lodestar for 
strengthening free speech under Article 22. 
B. History and Contemporary Understanding of the 1968 Amendment 
Recognizing the limited utility of ratification history,
133
 it is unfortu-
nate that the record of the 1964 New Hampshire Constitutional Convention 
sheds so little light on whether the amendment was aimed to bring New 
Hampshire‘s constitutional protection of free speech above that of the First 
Amendment.  Of course, since this was well past incorporation, a provision 
no stronger than the First Amendment would have had no immediate effect 
on the rights of New Hampshire‘s people.134  The sole explanation from the 
1964 convention journal regarding the purpose of the amendment could be 
interpreted in different ways: 
What we have proposed to you, as amended, provides simply that 
the right of free speech which is, of course, an essential part of our 
heritage, is spelled out very clearly in the Constitution.  The Con-
  
 130. Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 386, 389, 373 A.2d 647 (1977) (citations omitted). 
 131. See Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of Freedom 
of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 317 (1985). 
 132. Thirty-two states have enacted press shield laws, and California has added a press shield to its 
constitution.  Courts in most of the remaining states have followed New Hampshire‘s lead by finding a 
shield in either the common law or the state constitution.  Jeffrey S. Nestler, The Underprivileged 
Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
201, 225–26 & nn.119–24 (2005). 
 133. N.H. Mun. Trust Workers‘ Comp. Fund v. Flynn, 133 N.H. 17, 21, 573 A.2d 439, 441 (1990) 
(―The statements made by the delegates to the constitutional convention are not always significant in 
determining the meaning of a particular amendment.  To be entitled to consideration, the delegates‘ 
statements must interpret the amendment‘s language in accordance with its plain and common meaning 
while being reflective of its known purpose or object.‖) (discussing the interpretation of N.H. Const. pt. 
I, art. 28-a, adopted in 1984); see also Wheeler ex rel. Boulanger v. Morin, 93 N.H. 40, 50, 35 A.2d 
513, 519 (1943) (Marble, C.J., dissenting) (―While language is usually to be interpreted in the light of 
the circumstances surrounding its utterance, such circumstances cannot be shown for the purpose of 
contradicting the plain meaning of the language used . . . .‖  (citing Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sond-
heimer & Co., 239 F. 976, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (Hand, J.)); accord Cohen v. Att‘y Gen., 259 N.E.2d 
539, 571–72 (Mass. 1970). 
 134. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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stitution presently has several references to it so that inferentially 
you can presume that the right to free speech is guaranteed in our 
New Hampshire Constitution.  The right is, of course, guaranteed 
under our Federal Constitution.  What we wanted to do was to be 
absolutely certain the Constitution was clear, that there could be no 
possible misunderstanding or misinterpretation of it.  And we felt 
that the right to free speech should, consequently, be enunciated in 
the Constitution and we had included it with that part which relates 
to the liberty of the press—the freedom of the press.  We conse-




The 1968 voters‘ guide indicated that free speech had been omitted 
from the 1784 constitution ―due to an historic error of omission made in 
1783.‖136  The ballot read, ―Do you favor an addition to the Bill of Rights 
in the New Hampshire Constitution guaranteeing free speech together with 
the liberty of the press?‖137  The ―presumption‖ that the New Hampshire 
Constitution guaranteed free speech prior to the 1968 amendment follows 
from the breadth of the ―liberty of the press,‖138 but is hard to reconcile 
with the opposition to the addition of free speech to the Massachusetts 
Constitution.  When Massachusetts considered adding free speech to its 
constitution in 1948, the move was criticized not only as unnecessary 
based on the existing protection from the Fourteenth Amendment as well 
  
 135. N.H. JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 218 (1964) (William P. Bittenberger of 
Deering, a member of the convention‘s Bill of Rights Committee, explaining the amendment). 
 136. MARSHALL, supra note 35, at 81.  It‘s not clear where the idea of a ―historic error of omission‖ 
came from.  Among early state constitutions, only Pennsylvania‘s and Vermont‘s expressed support for 
free speech.  The full text of the voters‘ guide included the ballot question, text accompanying infra 
note 137, as well as the following: 
NOW — AT THE PRESENT TIME, the state constitution‘s Bill of Rights guarantees free-
dom of the press; but due to a historic error of omission made in 1793, the right of the indi-
vidual citizen to freedom of speech was left out.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution now protects the right of New Hampshire citizens to exercise freedom of 
speech.  However, as a matter of our state‘s self-respect and good constitutional law, we 
should not be dependent on the federal government for the protection of this basic personal 
liberty. 
IF THIS AMENDMENT IS ADOPTED, by enough Yes votes on Question No. 6, freedom 
of speech will be added to the basic rights of every citizen, which are guaranteed by the 
New Hampshire Bill of Rights, and our state constitution, thus amended to rectify the histor-
ic omission refered [sic] to above, will be made more consonant with the 20th Century. 
 137. Ballot from the Town of Woodstock, New Hampshire (1968) (on file with author). 
 138. See Bowe v. Sec‘y of the Commonwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 129 (Mass. 1946) (―The press in its 
historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and 
opinion.‖).  Although Massachusetts acknowledged the absence of a free speech provision its pre-
amendment constitution, Commonwealth v. McGann, 100 N.E. 355, 356 (Mass. 1913) (comparison to 
California Constitution), New Hampshire did not.  E.g., State v. Derrickson, 97 N.H. 91, 93, 81 A.2d 
312, 313 (1951) (―The rights of freedom of assembly, speech and worship are accorded a high place in 
and are specifically guaranteed by the New Hampshire Constitution and statutes implementing it.‖). 
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as other existing state provisions, but dangerous, too.  The state bar even 
adopted a resolution in opposition.
139
 
If the exclusion of free speech from the Massachusetts Constitution 
was due to fears regarding the abuse of the right, then the later addition of 
the right can be seen as either an acceptance that the costs of giving consti-
tutional protection to the right do not outweigh the benefits, or an under-
standing (perhaps based in part on federal precedent) that the right to free 
speech is far from absolute.  Indeed, by 1968 (and 1948 in Massachusetts), 
the federal right to free speech, as incorporated to the states, had been well 
established.  In Massachusetts, fears about a state right to free speech nev-
ertheless persisted, to the extent that the Massachusetts Bar recommended 
against adopting the amendment.
140
 
Taken together, the 1964 convention statements and 1968 voters‘ 
guide imply that the free speech right added to the New Hampshire Consti-
tution was no different from the First Amendment right.  That is, the 
―right‖ added to Article 22 was not distinguished from the freedom of 
speech already protected by the federal government via the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.  Still, the context of ―free speech‖ in Article 22, 
which declares that it is ―essential to the security of freedom in a state‖ and 
―ought, therefore, to be inviolably preserved,‖ might nevertheless vary the 
meaning.  Moreover, even an understanding that the Article 22 right was 
on par with the corresponding First Amendment right would not dictate 
how to handle changes in First Amendment interpretation or even new 
state laws affecting speech.  In spite of the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court‘s commitment to original understanding, these interpretive ambigui-





 139. Frank W. Grinnell, The Unnecessary Proposal About Free Speech, 32 MASS. L. Q. 51, 51–52 
(1947). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Cf. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United State Fed-
eral Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 16–21 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).  There is a noteworthy distinction between 
original intent and original textual meaning, id., often lost in New Hampshire constitutional analysis.  
See, e.g., Baines v. N.H. Senate President, 152 N.H. 124, 133, 876 A.2d 768, 778 (2005) (quotations 
omitted): 
When interpreting a constitutional provision, we examine its purpose and intent.  By review-
ing the history of the constitution and its amendments, the court endeavors to place itself as 
nearly as possible in the situation of the parties at the time the instrument was made, that it 
may gather their intention from the language used, viewed in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances.  The language used by the people in the great paramount law which controls 
the legislature as well as the people, is to be always understood and explained in that sense 
in which it was used at the time when the constitution and the laws were adopted. 
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C. Other Constitutional Liberties in New Hampshire 
A number of state constitutional rights in New Hampshire afford 
greater protection than their federal counterparts, but the variety of opi-
nions makes it hard to discern a pattern.  Certainly the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court has not hesitated to reject the U.S. Supreme Court‘s ap-
proach to particular rights.  State v. Ball, for instance, was not the first case 
to yield a stronger independent state interpretation, and now it fits within a 
line of search and seizure cases that deviate from federal interpretation.
142
  
The rationale expressed in Ball for requiring a higher level of probable 
cause for warrantless seizures under the plain view doctrine is largely con-
clusory, relying on the same reasonableness standard but interpreting it to 
forbid ―[s]eizure on mere suspicion.‖143 
Overall, the strongest state constitutional protections relative to federal 
rights exist with regard to search and seizure under Article 19.  Even 
though the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for federal 
cases in 1914, New Hampshire avoided enforcing an exclusionary rule 
until Mapp v. Ohio
144
 mandated it by incorporation in 1961.  Instead, New 
Hampshire had maintained ―the strict common law rule that a court must 
admit all competent and probative evidence regardless of its source.‖145  As 
federal decisions narrowed ―the scope and content of fourth amendment 
rights‖ through the 1980s, the New Hampshire Supreme Court ―repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of undertaking independent interpretation of 
[its] State constitutional guarantees.‖146  This culminated with the rejection, 
over a strongly worded dissent by Justice Thayer, of the federal good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.
147
  Justice Thayer, referring to State v. 
Ball, argued that ―[h]aving the power to interpret some provisions as pro-
viding greater protection, however, does not mandate that we must interp-
ret our constitution more broadly, nor does it give us permission to invent 
new constitutional protections . . . .‖148  Yet the majority concluded that the 
exclusionary rule had been implicitly recognized as existing under Article 
19, and that the good faith exception is incompatible with the privacy 
rights and prohibition of the issuance of warrants without probable cause in 
  
 142. State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 232, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (1983). 
 143. Id. at 353 (construing N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19). 
 144. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961). 
 145. State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 384, 653 A.2d 1097, 1103 (1995); see id. at 394, 654 A.2d at 
1110 (Thayer, J., dissenting) (―This court steadfastly refused to adopt an exclusionary rule and only 
applied it when forced to do so by the federal judiciary.‖ (citing State v. Mara, 916 N.H. 463, 467, 78 
A.2d 922, 925 (1951))). 
 146. Id. at 384, 654 A.2d at 1104 (majority opinion). 
 147. Id. at 385, 654 A.2d at 1105. 
 148. Id. at 397, 654 A.2d at 1112 (Thayer, J., dissenting). 
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Article 19.  Citing the purpose of Article 19 when it was adopted in 1784, 
the court asserted that deterrence of police misconduct is not the sole aim 
of the rule, and to bolster its holding, it cited several other state courts that 
had ―held that the good faith exception is inconsistent with state constitu-
tional requirements of probable cause.‖149 
However, the departure from federal search and seizure jurisprudence 
has been far from complete.  In 2003, for example, only Chief Justice 
Brock argued in favor of applying the exclusionary rule to driver‘s license 
suspension proceedings.
150
  With regard to the standard for evaluating au-
thority under a search warrant to search a container on the premises,
151
 
community care-taking functions, and the inventory exception allowing 
warrantless searches,
152
 New Hampshire has followed the federal approach. 
Despite different language, the right against self-incrimination under 
the state constitution has generally been found identical to the federal 
right,
153
 except for the standard required for admissibility of a defendant‘s 
confession.
154
  The state high court expressly rejected the federal prepon-
derance standard in 1977, based on its determination that danger of invo-
luntary confessions deserves a greater safeguard.
155
  The state has also fol-
lowed the federal approach to the confrontation clause, relying in part on 
Massachusetts‘s interpretation of its identical provision.156 
D. Other States’ Treatment of Free Speech 
Keeping in mind that the text of Massachusetts‘s corresponding article 
is weaker, Massachusetts is a useful place to begin looking at sister state 
approaches to free speech.
157
  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
generally follows federal analysis of free speech issues,
158
 but has on one 
  
 149. Id. at 387, 654 A.2d at 1105 (majority opinion). 
 150. Jacobs v. Dir., N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 149 N.H. 502, 506–07, 823 A.2d 752, 756 (2003) 
(Brock, C.J., dissenting). 
 151. State v. Leiper, 145 N.H. 233, 761 A.2d 458 (2000). 
 152. State v. Denoncourt, 149 N.H. 308, 821 A.2d 997 (2003). 
 153. See State v. Hearns, 151 N.H. 226, 855 A.2d 549 (2004). 
 154. State v. Laurie, 135 N.H. 438, 444–45, 606 A.2d 1077, 1080 (1992) (discussing how the State 
carries the burden of proving that a confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than 
under a mere preponderance standard). 
 155. State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147, 370 A.2d 1153, 1154 (1977). 
 156. See In re Juvenile 2003-195, 150 N.H. 644, 652, 843 A.2d 318, 324 (2004); State v. Peters, 133 
N.H. 791, 794, 587 A.2d 587, 588–89 (1991). 
 157. Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 143 N.H. 429, 437, 725 A.2d 1082, 1088 (1999) (―Because much of 
the New Hampshire Constitution was taken from the Massachusetts Constitution, this court gives 
weight to interpretations of relevant portions of the Massachusetts Constitution when interpreting 
similar New Hampshire provisions.‖  (citations omitted)). 
 158. Hosford v. Sch. Cmte. of Sandwich, 659 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 n.5 (Mass. 1996) (―Our State free-
dom of speech analysis is guided by the Federal analysis.‖); cf. In re Matter of Amendment to S.J.C. 
Rule 3:07, 495 N.E.2d 282, 284 n.4 (Mass. 1986) (―Although in some circumstances art. 16 of the 
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occasion extended its state constitutional rights further. In Commonwealth 
v. Sees, it frowned on attempting to distinguish ―free speech in a bar and 




In Maryland, whose Article 40
160
 also shares language with New 
Hampshire‘s Article 22, free speech under the state declaration of rights 
has been interpreted to be coextensive with free speech under the First 
Amendment.
161
  Although Maryland‘s high court has interpreted other state 
constitutional rights differently than their federal counterparts,
162
 it has 




Oregon certainly claims the strongest protection for speech under its 
constitution, based in part on the breadth implied by its wording: ―No law 
shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion or restricting the 
right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every 
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.‖164  The Oregon Su-
preme Court‘s historical analysis has led to the conclusion that disfavored 
categories of speech like pornography and commercial advertising deserve 
just as much protection as other speech.
165
  Applying a ―natural rights‖ 
approach to free speech in lieu of the more common balancing tests, the 
court first evaluates whether a challenged regulation is directed at restrain-
ing speech or expression; if so, the regulation will be upheld only if ―whol-
ly confined within some historical exception that was well established 
when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted 
  
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights . . . may protect expression not entitled to protection as a matter of 
Federal constitutional law, there is no reason to conclude that our State Constitution affords greater 
protection to lawyer solicitation than does the Federal Constitution.‖). 
 159. 373 N.E.2d 1151, 1155 (Mass. 1978). 
 160. MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 40 (―That the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably preserved; that 
every citizen of the State ought to be allowed to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of that privilege.‖). 
 161. See Newell v. Runnels, 967 A.2d 729, 746 (Md. 2009) (―The protections accorded by Article 40 
are generally ‗coextensive‘ with the protections accorded by the First Amendment.‖  (quoting Jakanna 
Woodworks, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 689 A.2d 65, 70 (Md. 1997))); accord State v. Brookins, 844 
A.2d 1162, 1165 n.2 (Md. 2004) (―This Court has often treated Art. 40 [of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights] as being in pari materia with the First Amendment and has stated that the legal effect of both 
provisions is substantially the same.‖ (quotations and citation omitted, alteration in original)). 
 162. DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 367 (Md. 1999). 
 163. Freedman v. State, 197 A.2d 232, 236 (Md. 1964), rev’d, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); see Howard 
Sports Daily v. Weller, 18 A.2d 210, 214–15 (Md. 1941).  I have been unable to locate in Maryland 
case law an explanation for the conclusion that the rights should be interpreted coextensively. 
 164. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added); State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 629 (Or. 2005) 
(―[T]he words are so clear and sweeping that we think that we would not be keeping faith with the 
framers who wrote them if we were to qualify or water them down, unless the historical record demon-
strated clearly that the framers meant something other than what they said.‖). 
 165. See generally Barnhart, supra note 48. 
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and that the guarantees then or in 1859 [upon adoption of the Oregon Con-
stitution] demonstrably were not intended to reach.‖166 
V.  APPLYING ARTICLE 22 
Although an exhaustive list or analysis of unresolved free speech ques-
tions in New Hampshire is beyond the scope of this note, this note ad-
dresses the state action requirement and sketches a framework for stronger 
independent free speech jurisprudence under Article 22. 
A. State Action 
The First Amendment differs from many state constitutions in its ap-
proach to rights, articulating limitations on the federal government‘s pow-
ers rather than affirmative acknowledgements of rights.
167
  Emboldened by 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
168
 several state courts have relied on 
this distinction to justify diminishing the state action requirement for a 
constitutional free speech violation.
169
  New Hampshire‘s Supreme Court, 
meanwhile, has expressly held that the state constitution can only be vi-
olated through state action.
170
  Indeed, the structure of the New Hampshire 





 166. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d at 633–34 (quoting State v. Robertson, 569 P.2d 569, 576 (Or. 1982)). 
 167. See Simon, supra note 131, at 311. 
 168. 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (rejecting appellant‘s argument that California‘s finding that free speech 
rights extend to private property held open to the public amounted to an unlawful taking under the Fifth 
Amendment). 
 169. See Simon, supra note 131, at 313 (identifying six states that followed California‘s lead).  But 
see Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns, and the Promise 
of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL‘Y 533, 557–58 (2004) (identifying thirteen states that have 
not taken the California approach). 
 170. State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687, 691, 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (cited by HippoPress, LLC v. SMG, 
150 N.H. 304, 308, 837 A.2d 347, 353 (2003) (applying the state action requirement to Article 22)).  
But cf. Matthew S. Fuchs, Free Exercise of Speech in Shopping Malls: Bases that Support and Inde-
pendent Interpretation of Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 449 
(2006) (arguing that Maryland‘s constitutional free speech provision should be read like California‘s). 
 171. State v. Tapply, 124 N.H. 318, 325, 470 A.2d 900, 904–05 (1983) (―The reservation precedes 
the grant.  Before they create the power of proportional taxation . . .  and the supreme legislative power 
. . . and before they form themselves into a state . . . they lay the foundation, and therein reserve those 
personal liberties, which, upon the evidence of history and their own experience, they think cannot 
safely be surrendered to government.‖ (quoting State v. U.S. & Canada Express Co., 60 N.H. 219, 250 
(1880))). 
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B. Balancing Framework 
The chief purpose of this note is to provide the fodder for jurists and 
other practitioners to articulate their own independent interpretations of 
free speech in Article 22, but I will outline one possible framework based 
on the above research, albeit without deeply exploring the consequences 
that would flow from its application. 
Constitutional rights are enumerated in order to be protected, not mere-
ly to be weighed against competing interests.
172
  Nevertheless, free speech 
and other constitutional rights cannot exist as true absolutes,
173
 and consti-
tutional law accordingly relies on various balancing tests to define the ex-
tent of protected activity.  A stronger independent free speech jurispru-
dence under Article 22 fits harmoniously within this existing balancing test 
framework. 
As under the First Amendment, the analysis should begin by determin-
ing whether affected communication is protected speech or qualifies as one 
of several established exceptions, e.g., fighting words, threats, incitement 
to illegal activity, and obscenity,
174
 and the proper inquiry is whether the 
communication was understood to be outside the scope of constitutional 
protection when the pertinent constitutional provision was adopted.
175
  In 
Oregon, the analysis also involves a determination as the whether the con-
stitutional provision was intended to supersede existing limitations on 
speech, but there is no evidence that the amendment to Article 22 was con-
templated as a means to repeal existing laws.  Thus, statutory limitations 
on speech existing in New Hampshire in 1968 remain immune to invalida-
tion on free speech grounds under Article 22, and the question is how to 
treat regulations of speech implemented after 1968. 
  
 172. See id.; Wooster v. Plymouth, 62 N.H. 193, 200 (1882) (quoted supra note 118); see also 
MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 42–57 (2001) (critiquing a cost-benefit approach to free speech jurisprudence 
and offering support for the proposition that free speech rights are an end unto themselves). 
 173. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS 37 (2001) (―To insist that all 
speech, regardless of its nature, should presumptively be equally protected, would be both patently 
absurd and inimical to the freedom of really valuable speech.‖); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121, 126 (1970) (suggesting that there are no actual ―free speech ‗abso-
lutists‘‖); see also Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(warning that weighing civil liberty too heavily against ―attempts to maintain order‖ would ―convert 
the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact‖). 
 174. See IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 51–52 (1st Cir. 2008) (identifying speech exempt 
from First Amendment protection), cert.denied, 77 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-1202); 
United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (listing exceptions), cert. granted, 129 S. 
Ct. 1984 (Apr. 20, 2009) (No. 08-769). 
 175. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482–85 (1957) (holding ―that obscenity is not within 
the area of constitutionally protected speech or press‖ based on evidence that it was outside the protec-
tion intended for speech and press at the time the First Amendment was adopted). 
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The operative clause of Article 22 supports a presumption against the 
constitutionality of any restrictions enacted after 1968 affecting protected 
speech.  To the lay voter considering the amendment, to ―inviolably pre-
serve‖ free speech would likely have meant this: ―The Constitution will 
protect my right to say in the future whatever I am free to say now.‖176  
The typical voter would have recognized that free speech rights are not 
absolute—that the amendment would preserve rather than expand the 
scope of his freedom to communicate.  But because it was to be preserved 
inviolably, this freedom would, generally speaking, no longer be subject to 
encroachment by new regulations.
177
 
As a threshold manner, Article 22‘s protection extends to expressive 
conduct, but not to all conduct incidentally affected by a regulation.
178
  
After resolving these threshold questions, the most critical determination in 
free speech cases is whether a regulation is a content-neutral time, place, 
and manner restriction.  If so, under the First Amendment the regulation 
receives intermediate scrutiny, and will be upheld if it is ―narrowly tailored 
to serve a significant governmental interest, and that [it] leave[s] open am-
ple alternative channels for communication of the information.‖179  Other-
wise, protected speech is entitled to strict scrutiny under the First Amend-
ment, which requires that a regulation ―must be narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling Government interest, and if a less restrictive alternative 
would serve the Government‘s purpose, the legislature must use that alter-
native.‖180 
In Carlson’s Chrysler, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied the 
Central Hudson test for commercial speech regulations rather than content-
neutral intermediate scrutiny.
181
  Because Article 22 does not distinguish 
among classes of speech, it is not appropriate to disfavor types of speech 
other than based on the restrictions existing in 1968, and I advocate aban-
  
 176. In applying an original understanding approach to Article 22, I am deeply skeptical of the dis-
tinction between protecting speech and protecting ―free speech.‖  See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 112, at 
13.  Typical voters in 1968 probably would not have believed that the amendment would preserve an 
abstract right to ―free speech‖ instead of their actual extant liberty. 
 177. See Tapply, 124 N.H. at 325, 470 A.2d at 904–05 (1983) (quoted supra note 171). 
 178. Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning protected by the First Amend-
ment), with United States v. O‘Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting ―the view that an apparently 
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‗speech‘ whenever the person engaging in the conduct 
intends thereby to express an idea‖); see also IMS Health, Inc., 550 F.3d at 51–52 (attempting to distin-
guish speech from unprotected conduct). 
 179. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 180. United States v. Playboy Entm‘t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 804 (2000); accord Simon & Schus-
ter, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991). 
 181. Compare Carlson‘s Chrysler v. City of Concord, 156 N.H. 399, 402, 938 A.2d 69, 72 (2007), 
with Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, No. 06-CV-400 SM, 2007 WL 1847307, at *2 (D.N.H. 
June 25, 2007) (applying intermediate scrutiny in a challenge to a revision of the same zoning ordin-
ance). 
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doning Central Hudson in favor of strict scrutiny for commercial speech 
cases that do not otherwise qualify for intermediate scrutiny.
182
  But New 
Hampshire has long embraced allowing the state‘s police power to limit 
the exercise of rights based on time, place, and manner restrictions,
183
 and 
such regulations accordingly deserve less than strict scrutiny.  In applying 
a version of intermediate scrutiny under Article 22, upholding speech regu-
lations based on ―significant‖ government interests is difficult to reconcile 
with the meaning imparted by the 1968 amendment, that free speech would 
be shielded from prospective encroachments by government—that is, the 
evaluation of government interests should be informed by the status quo in 
1968.  In a case like Carlson’s Chrysler, the challenged regulation might 
not survive intermediate scrutiny, in part because the state interests in ―aes-
thetics‖ were not established as of the 1968 amendment.184  Moreover, the 
forceful language of Article 22, in combination with other rights such as 
the property rights recognized in Part I, Article 2 of the New Hampshire 




By its plain terms, strict scrutiny, in requiring the government to dem-
onstrate a compelling interest, accords with Article 22‘s prefatory clause, 
which declares that ―free speech . . . is essential to the security of a free 
state.‖  Only a truly paramount government interest could justify the limi-
tation of such a right.  Because Article 22 elevates free speech above other 
rights and interests not only by its prefatory clause but through its com-
mand that the right remain inviolable, compelling interests should be de-
fined more narrowly under Article 22 than under the First Amendment.  As 
with intermediate scrutiny, defining the government interests to be used in 
the test is an inexact science,
186
 and should be informed by the context of 
the 1968 amendment.  In application, strict scrutiny under Article 22 might 
  
 182. See HENRY COHEN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9 (2008) (noting that in nine of the last ten most recent cases 
in which it has applied the Central Hudson test, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down the chal-
lenged speech restriction, and stating that ―the Court has found it unnecessary to consider whether to 
abandon the test, because it has been striking down the statutes in question anyway‖). 
 183. See State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 141, 16 A.2d 508, 512 (1940) (citing State v. White, 64 N.H. 48, 
50, 5 A. 828, 830 (1886)) (quoted supra note 129). 
 184. Neither the challenged town ordinance nor the enabling statute were enacted until well after 
1968. 
 185. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2 (―All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights—
among which are . . . acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property . . . .‖); Cmty. Res. for Justice, Inc. 
v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748, 758, 917 A.2d 707, 717 (2007) (―As the right to use and enjoy 
property is an important substantive right, we use our intermediate scrutiny test to review equal protec-
tion challenges to zoning ordinances that infringe upon this right.‖). 
 186. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Government Interests: An Essential but Unana-
lyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988) (endeavoring to define ―com-
pelling government interests‖). 
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come to resemble a jurisprudence based primarily on ―selective exclusions 
rather than tiers,‖187 under which most speech is presumptively constitu-
tional. 
In Burson v. Freeman,
188
 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld restrictions 
on campaigning at polling places, even though it was a facially content-
based regulation of political speech in a public forum—the archetype of a 
law that burdens constitutional free speech.
189
  The Court reasoned that the 
law was necessary to advance compelling state interests regarding the right 
to vote freely ―in an election conducted with integrity and reliability.‖190  
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, explored the long history of 
similar state laws, which existed in at least thirty-four states by 1900.
191
  
New Hampshire was not one of those states. 
Today, New Hampshire‘s restriction on polling place picketing is rela-
tively benign, restricting only the insides of polling places and a 10-foot 
pathway outside.
192
  Although protecting the right to vote may be a com-
pelling governmental interest in the context of Article 22, it is not at all 
clear that the existing polling place regulation is necessary to protect this 
right.  Moreover, the regulation, enacted over a decade after the amend-
ment to Article 22, is inconsistent with the free speech rights enjoyed in 
New Hampshire in 1968.  An expansion of the law proposed and voted 
down last year that would have been more akin to the regulation upheld in 




 187. SUNSTEIN, supra note 173, at 151–52; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible 
Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2418 (1997) (advocating that 
―the Court to shift away from means-ends scrutiny, and toward an approach that operates through 
categorical rules—such as a per se ban on content-based speech restrictions imposed by the govern-
ment as sovereign—coupled with categorical exceptions‖). 
 188. 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 189. Id. at 196–211. 
 190. Id. at 198–99. 
 191. Id. at 214–16 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 192. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:43 (2008). 
 193. H.R. 1218, 2008 Leg., 160th Sess. (N.H. 2008), available at 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/legislation/2008/HB1218.html.  The House Election Law Committee 
unanimously recommended that the bill be voted down: 
This bill would limit polling place visibility workers to holding only one sign no larger than 
3 feet by 2 feet.  The bill‘s sponsor testified that he brought the bill to minimize the risk of 
physical injury to voters and the chance that large signs may intimidate voters.  The solution 
to these problems—if they exist at all—is not to restrict the right to freely express political 
opinion, but to restrict the proximity of the signs to the voters.  Because this bill opts to sup-
press free speech instead of proposing a real solution that does not infringe a fundamental 
constitutional right, the committee voted unanimously against it. 
Hearing on H.R. 1218, 2008 Leg., 160th Sess. (N.H. 2008) (statement of Rep. David M. Pierce, for the 
House Election Law Cmte.), available at 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/house/caljourns/calendars/2008/houcal2008_18.html. 
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C. Conclusion 
Although this note finds support for an expansive interpretation of free 
speech in Article 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution, this potential 
should not be overstated.  The state supreme court has not embraced a liv-
ing constitution approach, and instead repeatedly emphasizes its aim of 
discerning the original purpose and understanding of constitutional text.
194
  
Nevertheless, the text of Article 22, bolstered by its historical context and 
various persuasive authorities, strongly supports independent adjudication 
of free speech more protective than the First Amendment. 
  
 194. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183, 186, 635 A.2d 1375, 1377–78 (1993) 
(quoted supra note 117); see also N.H. Mun. Trust Workers‘ Comp. Fund v. Flynn, 133 N.H. 17, 21, 
573 A.2d 439, 441 (1990) (―[W]e will not redraft the constitution in an attempt ‗to make it conform to 
an intention not fairly expressed in it.‘‖ (quoting Concrete, Inc. v. Rheaume Builders, Inc., 101 N.H. 
59, 61, 132 A.2d 133, 135 (1957))). 
